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Boag v, MacDougal is invoked in regards to the entire

following document, and the requirement that the pleadings of pro
se litigants are to be construed liberally. This standard should
have been applied to the original petition as well. Boag v. MacDougal, 454 US 364, 70 LEd.2d 894, 102 SCt 1697(1964).
°
Scott" are

Bouie v. Columbia, Rogers v. Tennessee, and Smith v.invoked

for their decisions on "ex post facto11 issues,

and are applied to argument A,iii, the tolling of the Utah sentence
0

State v. Grate (or Grate v. State) is invoked for its

ruling on what constitutes when a person has been "charged". It is
applied to argument A,ii, the cancelation of revocation hearing.
0

Houston v. Lack, 487 US 266, 101 LEd.2d 245, 108 SCt.

2379(1988), is invoked for its decision that a prisoner's pleadings are considered "filed" when given to prison authorities to be
mailed.
0

US Constitution, Amendment 4 and the analogous article

of Utah's constitution are invoked and are applied to argument A,
iii.
0

Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure 65B,sections (c) and (e)

of the 1995 Utah Code correspond to sections (b) and (d) Rule 65B
of the Utah Code from 1996 to present. They are invoked to demonstrate the claims of the petition were properly filed under 65B.
They are presented

for the entire argument A, sections i, ii, and

iii.
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Issue Presented for Review
There really is only one question presented for review- was
the dismissal of the appellant's (hereinafter referred to as "Mr,
Tucker") petition for relief proper? Yet this question itself, if
it is to be answered, asks the questions:
•was it proper to dismiss with prejudice valid claims of damage when Mr, Tucker offered on the record at oral argument
to withdraw them, and was not given the opportunity to amend the petition to remove them? ,
•was it proper to dismiss the remaining claims of the petition, for the stated reason of its containing an admixture
of Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure Rules 65B and 65C (hereinafter referred to as Rule 65B and 65C, respectively) with
out allowing Mr. Tucker to amend the petition? , and
•was it proper to dismiss the petition for the stated reasons whena) Mr. Tucker stated on record that he makes no claims
for post-conviction relief;
b) The State identified no claims which were allegedly
for post-conviction relief; and
c) The State offered no evidence that any of Mr. Tucker's claims were anything other than valid claims for
extraordinary relief properly filed under Rule 65B.

The question this Court must therefore ask itself is does
the petition of Mr. Tucker contain claims for post-conviction relief? If the answer to this question is in the negative then this

Court must ask itself why Mr. Tucker's petition was dismissed in
the first place?

Whether Mr. Tucker's petition for extraordinary relief contains claims for post-conviction relief is a mixed question of
fact and of law. Mr. Tucker is unable to cite relevant authority
pertaining to standard of review, or indeed much relevant authority at all, due to the fact that he has no access to any state
case-law at the federal facility where he is now housed. Mr. Tucker asserts, however, that under Boag v. MacDougal,70 LEd.2d 551,
a pro se litigant's pleadings must be construed liberally despite,
among other things, a failure to cite proper legal authority.

Statement of the Case
This case is an appeal from a Third Judicial District Court's
dismissal of a Rule 65B petition for extraordinary relief. Mr.
Tucker filed his petion in the Third Judicial District Court as a
response to actions made by the State of Utah during his parole
violation and revocation process. The office of the Attorney General, acting as the respondent and representing the State of Utah,
filed a motion to dismiss on procedural grounds, both as their response and instead of answering the merits of the claims of the
petition. Their claim- that Mr. Tucker's petition contained postconviction relief claims that should properly be filed under Rule
65C.
1. It is quite possible that the dismissal of Mr. Tucker's
petition for the stated reasons amounts to a denial of due
process, and thus was a manifest consttitutional error.

Mr. Tucker filed a reply to the states motion to dismiss. Oral arguments were given before the Honorable Glen K. Iwasaki. At
oral argument Mr. Tucker stated his belief that his claims were
properly filed under Rule 65B as either "actions of the Board of
Pardons11 (hereinafter referred to as the BOP) or as "other wrongful restraints on personal liberty'1, both of which are plainly enumerated under Rule 65B. Mr. Tucker also made the offer at that
time that he could withdraw the claims for damages from the proceedings .

The state pointed out no specific claim as being one for post
conviction relief, nor offered any evidence that any of Mr. Tucker's claims were for post- conviction relief. However, and in response to Mr. Tucker's admission that he used a 1995 volume of the
Utah Code and filed his claims under subsections (c) and (e), the
Attorney General pointed out that legislation had created a separate rule, 65C, for post-conviction relief since 1995. The State
then offered to send Mr. Tucker the updated versions of Rules 65B
and 65C so that he could refile his claims properly.

After hearing arguments the judge dismissed Mr. Tucker's
claims for damages "with prejudice", and dismissed the rest of the
petition with instructions that Mr. Tucker file his Rule 65B and
Rule 65C issues in separate petitions.

Summary of the Arguments
Both the lower court and states counsel make a mistake in
classifying Mr. Tucker's claims as claims for post-conviction re-

lief. Mr. Tucker thinks that this is a mistake both of fact and of
law. Mr. Tucker could not possibly be seeking relief from his 1990
state conviction for the simple reason that it occurred before the
events of the parole violation process that he bases his petition
on.

Mr. Tucker's Utah sentence stems from an incident in April

of 1990, for which he was sentenced in May of 1990. The incidents
that form the basis of the petition, the arrest for parole violation, the intervening 19 months before revocation of parole, and
the tolling of his Utah sentence while "paroled" to his federal
sentence, all occurred after May, 1998.

Further, Mr. Tucker could not possibly be seeking relief from
the 2001 federal conviction that arose out of the parole violation
investigation. The state court system has no power to grant relief
over a federal conviction. Mr. Tucker is therefore at a loss as
to how the state, as a respondent, and the lower court itself characterize the claims of the petition as being for post-conviction
relief. The petion clearly identifies each claim as being either
actions of the BOP, or other wrongful restraints on personal liberty, both of which plainly fall under Rule 65B before or after
the creation of Rule 65C.

Finally, as a prisoner, Mr. Tucker was made to pay a substantial filing fee to file his petition. Even at a reduced fee
of approximately $65.

this fee represented more than 2 months

wages for Mr. Tucker at the prison. Even if the petition were, as
both the state and the court proclaim, a bastard "hybrid", Mr.

Tucker should have been granted leave to amend the petition.

ARGUMENTS
A, The petition raises no claims for post-conviction relief.

The court erred in accepting at face value the states contention that Mr. Tuckerfs petition contained claims for post-conviction relief. There is nothing in the record to signify which of
Mr. Tucker's claims it would have the court believe were claims
for post-conviction relief. The court itself makes no identification of any particular claims as being for post-conviction relief.
And most importantly Mr. Tucker stated on record at oral argument
that he made no claims for post-conviction relief, but only claims
either against "actions of the Board of Pardons" or "other wrongful restraints on personal liberty".

The state obviously confuses the nature of Mr. Tucker's requested relief as being a claim for post-conviction relief. The
type of relief Mr. Tucker seeks, the immediate termination of his
Utah sentence for example, might more customarily be reserved to
claims of post-conviction relief, but it is also proper relief in
an improper parole revocation process as well. And tha clearly
falls under the egis of Rule 65B, as parole revocation in Utah is
the sole dominion of the Board of Pardons. It is the actions of
Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) as wrongful restraints on liberty, and the actions of the Board of Pardons (BOP), as they relate to Mr. Tucker's Utah parole violation, not any subsequent
conviction, that he is seeking relief from. Thus Rule 65B.

i The warrant for Mr, Tucker's arrest
The BOP issued a warrant to AP&P

for Mr, Tucker's arrest.

This warrant, and indeed all arrest warrants issued by the BOP,
stated that the subject was to be arrested and returned "to actual
custody" so that a determination could be made as to whether there
was probable cause to believe that the subject had violated his
parole. An arrest warrant. Without probable cause. The Constitutions of Utah and of the United States forbid this. This action by
the BOP is but one of the claims for relief Mr. Tucker properly
filed under Rule 65B.

ii The cancelation of parole revocation hearing
Mr. Tucker was arrested, under a "Board warrant", on 06-12-98
and a parole revocation hearing was scheduled for 08-05-98. Upon
that date Mr. Tucker was notified that this hearing was cancelled
indefinitely, stated reason; "pending the adjudication of new charges". A "parole violation report" filed by the hearing officer
that day stated that charges would be filed

"in the next two

weeks". The indictment issued by the Grand Jury was filed 08-19-98
a full two weeks after the cancellation of Mr. Tucker's revocation
hearing. In other words, the charges did not exist at the time of
the cancellation of Mr. Tucker's revocation hearing. There were
no "new charges" to adjudicate.
2
State v. Grate

held that a person is not "charged" until

2 Mr. Tucker is unable to supply case citation for two reasons,

a complaint i s formally f i l e d a g a i n s t a p e r s o n AND he i s

served

n o t i c e of the charges he must answer, where he must answer and
when. The i n d i c t m e n t was not f i l e d u n t i l August 19, 1998- Mr.
Tucker was not served u n t i l September 2 1 , 1998. Both of t h e s e ev e n t s o c c u r r e d a f t e r the c a n c e l l e d r e v o c a t i o n h e a r i n g .

Obviously,

no "new charges 1 1 e x i s t e d a t the time Mr. T u c k e r ' s r e v o c a t i o n h e a r i n g was c a n c e l l e d . This c o n c l u s i o n i s i n e s c a p a b l e . What t h i s amounts to then i s the BOP e f f e c t i v e l y

a r r e s t i n g Mr. Tucker and b i n -

ding him over for f e d e r a l t r a i l , wirhout h i s even having been char
ged with a c r i m e .

The BOP i s g r a n t e d s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y to deny, g r a n t or r e voke p a r o l e s , to commute s e n t e n c e s , f i n e s or r e s t i t u t i o n .

But the

BOB i s not g r a n t e d the a u t h o r i t y to a r r a i g n s u s p e c t s , or even to
make p r o b a b l e cause d e t e r m i n a t i o n s . This i s p r e c i s e l y the a c t i v i t i e s covered by the " a c t i o n s of the Board of P a r d o n s " s u b s e c t i o n
of Rule 65B.

Had Mr. Tucker been a c i t i z e n w i t h o u t a p a r o l e , i t would have
been r e q u i r e d t h a t he be a r r a i g n e d w i t h i n 72 h o u r s or be r e l e a s e d .
2. (cont.) when Mr. Tucker was transferred to federal custody upon "parole"
he was not allowed to take his collected legal materials, which included his
relevant state statutory code and case law. Further, the federal facility in
which Mr. Tucker is now housed provides no access to these materials.
This is also the reason that Mr. Tucker is unable to c i t e to the record
in his brief as he was also unable to retain copies of the filings and pleadings made in the lower court. He was even denied, by the lower court, a copy
of the transcript of the arguments presented on 01-28-02.

As it was, Mr. Tucker was not officially arraigned until, or about
October 25, 1998. By Utah statute Mr. Tucker was entitled to a revocation hearing within 90 days or be released. Thus, even his diminished right as a parolee was violated. This is reminiscent of
the agents of King George III, and the evils that the framers of
the Constitution sought to protect us from. The Board of Pardons
and Paroles has become a tyrant in the tradition of Goerge III
himself. They think nothing of violating the constitution of their
state, nor the Constitution of the United States, itself. It is
therefore proper for Mr. Tucker to seek, under Rule 65B, as relief
for his re-incarceration by the BOP, termination of his Utah sentence.

iii The tolling of Utah sentence while in federal custody
First and foremost, this is an ex post facto application of a
clause that did not even exist as a part of Utah Code (UC) 76-3203 when Mr. Tucker was sentenced in 1990. Yet by its application
Mr. Tucker's Utah sentence expiration date is extended from 2005
to the year 2009, effectively increasing the length of Mr. Tuckers
sentence.

This violates the ex post facto clause of Utah's cons-

titution, as well as the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Secondly, from a reading of UC 76-3-203(8) it is plain that
the purpose of this section is to toll the sentence of a parolee
who gets convicted in finds himself incarcerated in another state
all while on parole to Utah. That is not the case here. Mr. Tuck-

er was not convicted while on parole. And in fact he had already
been revoked for the activities which constituted his federal
charges prior to his conviction on those charges. He was subsequently granted a new parole after conviction on those charges.
It is this subsequent parole that is at issue here.

Mr. Tucker was in the custody of the state of Utah, and could
not begin his federal sentence until Utah relenquished custody of
him. Utah is not anxiously awaiting the return of Mr. Tucker to
their state so that they may violate his parole, and therefore
toll his sentence until he is once again in their custody. Their
act relenquished their custody. Or would the BOP have us believe
that they could shuttle Mr. Tucker back and forth, from custody to
custody at whim? They are thus proposing a construction of the
statute that violates the very essence of the "interstate agreement on detainers act".

The BOP knew full well at the time they granted Mr. Tucker his
parole that he would be going to a federal facility. Their grant
of parole clearly demonstrates their intent that he should serve
the remainder outside of their confinement. Was this then a false
intent? Was the parole grant merely a pretense to effect a transfer of custodyin violation of the "detainers" act? Mr. Tucker was
released to a detainer. Utah has said "we have our pound of flesh?
Are we to allow them to flout with impugnity the "detainers" act,
as it has the constitution of its state, as well as that of the United states itself?

If Mr. Tucker is indeed on parole, and has done nothing himself to invalidate that parole, then surely the clock must be runing. Otherwise, of what value are the conditions of parole imposed
upon him? He is in the same position as if his parole had been
violated before it even took effect. Mr. Tucker has merely accepted what was purported to be a grant of parole. Yet he is being
treated exactly as if he has absconded from supervision and then
subsequently violated the law.

Or to look at it from another perspective, if Mr. Tucker were
to be found guilty of using drugs, assault, or some other such serious infraction while in federal custody on "parole", this would
be sufficient to reincarcerate him upon his federal release. Indeed, if this were not the case, then of what value are the parole
conditions? There can therefore be only one conclusion: The state
has released Mr. Tucker on parole. He was granted parole after his
federal conviction, which itself occurred after the revocation of
the parole he was serving when he committed the federal offense.
Mr. Tucker has done nothing to violate the conditions of the latest parole. The actions, movements, and transport of Mr. Tucker
were all conducted with the BOPfs knowledge, and therefore with
their authority and consent. Mr. Tucker's Parole, then, must be
in effect, and the time he spendson "parole" during his federal
sentence must be applied toward service of his Utah sentence.

This action of the BOP in tolling Mr. Tucker's Utah sentence
is properly filed under Rule 65B.

ivActions of Adult Probation and Parole
The same basic premise behind the arguments above apply also
to the claims for relief due to the actions of Adult Probation and
Parole (AP&P). It is by AP&P's contribution to the arrest and reincarceration of Mr. Tucker, as a parole violator, that Mr, Tucker seeks relief, and not relief from his prior state or subsequent
federal convictions.

His claims against AP&P for their part in

the violation and revocation of Mr. Tucker's parole were filed under the "other wrongful restraints on personal liberty11 clause of
Rule 65B.

Even here the "hybrid petition" theory for dismissal fails,
as Mr. Tucker is not attacking any conviction, His claims, therefore, cannot be claims for post conviction relief. At best, his
claims might be said to be for "post revocation" relief. But, of
course, there is no provision for "post revocation" relief, so Mr,
Tucker's claims are properly filed under Rule 65B.

TheAP&Pfs misuse of their authority to conduct warrantless
searches by allowing police officers to search Mr. Tucker's apartment the evening of June 11, 1998, without a search warrant, ostensibly as a "parole violation search" becomes a valid ground for
relief for Mr. Tucker when none of the evidencerecovered from the
search was ever requested from the police by AP&P nor was it used
at the revocation hearing that was finally held. Thus, AP&P were
clearly acting as police, for the police, and were merely utilizing the parole search to assist the police in evading the warrant requirement

of the Fourth Amendment, and that of Utah's con-

stitution as well.

The Court is reminded that Mr. Tucker was taken into custody
as a suspected parole violator on the 11th of June, 1998 and was
not revoked until the 2nd of February, 2000. He was incarcerated
at the Utah State Prison the entire intervening 20 months. His revocation hearing, scheduled for the 5th of August, 1998 was cancelled pending the "adjudication of new charges" that had not even
been filed yet. The arrest was effected by the device of a warrant
which stated on its face that probable cause for the arrest had
yet to be determined. Adult Probation and Parole was the arresting
agency. It is for AP&Pfs contributions to the extended incarceration and delayed parole revocation that Mr. Tucker seeks relief by
virtue of Rule 65B, for other wrongful restraints on personal liberty .

B. Mr, Tucker should have been allowed to amend the petition.
Mr. Tucker offered, at oral argument, to withdraw the claims
for damages from the proceedings. He was required to pay a filing
fee on the petition which was a substantial part of his inmate wages, equivalent, in fact, to two months wages of the average inmate. If the petition in fact contained claims for post-c<zrnviction
relief then it would have been proper to allow Mr. Tucker to amend
the petition to separate the claims.

Conclusion
Mr. Tucker properly filed a petition seeking relief from the
violation and revocation of his parole. The state of Utah, instead

of answering the merits of the petition, chose as their response
the frivolous argument that the petition was one for post-conviction relief. This contention is not supported by either fact or by
law. Mr. Tucker had also requested of the lower court that no continuances or extensions be granted, as this would have the effect
of invalidating some of his claims due to the fact that on April
2nd, 2002 he would be placed in the position of having to either
accept or refuse his parole.

The denial and dismissal of the petition was not warranted
by the facts, was not in the interests of justice, benefitted only
the state, and placed unnecessary rigor upon the petitioner by delaying a review of the facts until a time when the petitioner himself was forced to invalidate his claims.

Mr. Tucker therefore requests that the remaining three years,
two weeks and one day remaining of his Utah sentence at the time
of his release on "parole1* to federal custody on April 2, 2002 be
terminated in lieu of the three years, nine months and twenty one
days that he spent re-incarcerated as a result of theviolations of
his rights listed in the petition. This relief is requested specifically for the reasons that;
a.)

the state forfeited any argument pertaining to the actual merits of the petitioner's claims when they chose to
answer by filing for dismissal on frivolous grounds,

b.)

the state misrepresented the facts to the lower court
by claiming that the petition contained claims for postconviction relief, and

c.)

the lower court failed to establish factually that the
petition did in fact contain claims for post-cornvition
relief.

If this Court cannot or will not grant this relief, Mr. Tucker then requests reversal of the dismissal of his petition, and
that it be remanded back to the court below with intructions to
find in favor of the petitioner and grant him termination of his
Utah sentenceeffective April 2, 2002,

Mr. Tucker further requests that, unless mooted by the termination of his sentence, he be credited for time spent on parole
to his federal sentence and that his parole time "run" with his
federal time.

Oral Arguments
Oral argument is NOT requested, and it is in fact requested
that oral arguments NOT be granted as this would create even further delay and place the appellant in an even more inequitable position due to the unavailability of legal authority. Mr. Tucker is
in the unenviable position of having to stand on the strength of
the arguments contained herein.

Signed by my hand and dated th is

\X

Q

day of July, 2002.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this

^s

day of July, 2002, I

mailed a copy of the forgoing, postage pre-paid, to the following
Nancy L. Kemp
160 E. 300 S.

6th floor

P.O. Box 140856
SLC, Ut. 84114-0856

Q^a^

ADDENDUM

A further note on Argument A,iii, the tolling of the Utah
sentence, parole is a contract between the prisoner and the Department of Corrections. There is a duly signed contract that
contains no mention of the tolling of the sentence, only the conditions under which the parole shall remain extant. As the contract, known as "parole agreement" contains no provision for the
tolling of the parolee's sentence while in federal custody the
state is in violation of its contract with Mr. Tucker by tolling
his Utah sentence while he is in federal custody.

Mr. Tucker acknowledges his lack of exhibits and authorities
in this document, and makes abject appology for this. But this is
beyond his control as he was not allowed to take his collected
documents into federal custody when he was released on "parole"
from the Utah State Prison on April 2, 2002. It is hoped that the
Court will be liberal in this respect, and review the foregoing
in the eye of spying what strengths Mr. Tucker was able to suply under the circumstances.

